Money with a plan¶
Four boxes, each built for one war and sold on what it can hear, are one thing. Put enough of them into the same network and the box becomes part of a picture: the drone is identified, its operator named, and its take-off made conditional on that name.
On 11 February 2026 the European Commission published an action plan on drone and counter-drone security, and three commissioners presented it in Strasbourg. It is the document that would turn the devices in the other cases into infrastructure, and it is where the operator’s identification becomes a proposed condition of flight.
Three commissioners¶
Virkkunen, Brunner and Tzitzikostas split the plan three ways: detection, money, rules. Virkkunen’s line on the 5G sensing is “I am describing existing technology that we need now to deploy”. Brunner’s is €400 million this year and nine airports in three months. Tzitzikostas’s is the package, with “ technical safeguards, ensuring that drones cannot leave the ground unless the operator is identified”. The Dutch release adds the airspace picture “to identify legitimate drones”, the incident platform, and a tender to test 5G detection live.
Twenty-three measures¶
Measure |
Said by |
Their words |
When |
|---|---|---|---|
€400 million from the border fund: €150 million for surveillance drones used by Member States and Frontex, €250 million for Member States to buy drones and counter-drone systems |
Brunner |
“we are mobilising” |
2026 |
Frontex drones for border surveillance |
release |
continues to equip |
ongoing |
Drone Alliance with Ukraine |
plan, release |
more support, via the alliance |
in place |
Joint Research Centre site at Geel as a living laboratory |
release |
functions as |
ongoing |
5G detection of drones connected to a network |
Virkkunen |
“should be rapidly identified, tracked and disrupted” |
urgently |
5G sensing of unconnected drones from the mobile network Virkkunen, release |
“existing technology that we need now to deploy”; a tender to test it live |
tender, no date |
|
EU Drone Incident Platform |
Brunner, release |
“today, we are announcing”; stepwise set-up examined with Member States |
none given |
Airspace picture integrating all relevant data |
release |
measures to support its development |
none given |
Counter-Drone Centre of Excellence, the release’s knowledge centre for testing |
Brunner, release |
“we will launch” |
2027 |
Drone Security Package |
Tzitzikostas |
“my aim is to have this ready” |
after summer 2026 |
EU Trusted Drone Label |
Tzitzikostas |
“we will say more towards the end of the year, when I present our proposal” |
proposal end 2026 |
D-TECT industrial forum |
Virkkunen |
“we will expand the industrial engagement notably by launching” |
none given |
National Drone Security Coordinators |
Virkkunen |
“we are calling member states to appoint” |
none given |
Joint procurement and a large-scale deployment initiative |
Virkkunen |
“we will support” |
none given |
European sovereign command-and-control software |
Virkkunen, release |
“working towards the development” |
none given |
ICT supply-chain risk assessment and a Drone Security Toolbox |
Virkkunen |
“we will also work towards” |
none given |
EU-level guidance for critical infrastructure under the CER Directive |
Brunner |
“we will provide” |
none given |
Call to start-ups on meteorological balloons |
Virkkunen |
“we will launch a mission driven call” |
none given |
Standardised geographical zones |
Tzitzikostas |
“an improved definition”, “preparing the ground for future geofencing” |
none given |
Certification scheme for counter-drone systems |
release |
development of |
none given |
Annual EU counter-drone exercise |
release |
proposes |
none given |
Rapid EU counter-drone reaction teams |
Virkkunen, release |
“we also want to explore”; examine whether they can be set up |
none given |
Geofencing |
Brunner |
“the time is right to discuss” |
none given |
Twenty of the twenty-three measures will, aim to, or want to explore. Three of them use the present tense. Those are the ones with a bank account.
Virkkunen said it herself: “I am describing existing technology that we need now to deploy.” And it does exist, in Ukraine, in a war, where nobody in range is carrying the sort of phone that counts as an interesting part of the problem.
Switching it on across a continent full of people whose phones do count was the small detail nobody at the podium mentioned. It may have been an oversight. It may have been policy. Bureaucracy has always been admirably flexible about the distinction.
Until further notice¶
Every sensor in the other cases is one node; the plan is the grid. It would connect 5G base stations, incident reports and whatever else counts as relevant data into one picture whose purpose is to tell legitimate drones from the rest. It proposes to make a camera drone’s take-off conditional on its operator being identified. Attack D8 is the take-off it would withhold.
The reasons given are airports, smuggling, a utility with 1,300 overflights and drugs by the hundredweight. The plan, the speech and the press release have no sentence on retention: whether the picture keeps a track and for how long, whether it keeps the phones the base stations sensed alongside the drone, or who may ask it a question later. Attack D7 is the record kept in the meantime.
Last reviewed: 2026-09-25.